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Abstract 
The development of global trade and logistics chains has reshaped the market environment of 
the seaport and liner shipping sector. Against this background, there is no consensus 
regarding the relative market position between terminal operators (TOs) and global liner 
shipping companies (LSCs). Using the theory of power, this paper aims to investigate this 
issue in the context of Chinese hub seaports. To fulfil this purpose, this paper adopts a 
qualitative case study research design. Whereas the findings about power relationships in 
Chinese hub seaports are multi-dimensional, TOs appear to be in a more powerful position 
compared to LSCs. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways: it clarifies the 
market position between TOs and LSCs in the Chinese hub seaport sector, and it contributes 
to the development of the power theory with empirical findings from an underdeveloped 
research context. The overall findings are beneficial for TOs and LSCs to form business 
strategies and ultimately achieve business success.  
Keywords: Terminal operators, Liner shipping companies, Power patterns  
1. Introduction  
Maritime transportation has been a fast growing and changing market over the last few 
decades. The total world containerised trade reached 160 million TEUs in 2013 (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2014). The development of 
seaborne trade has resulted in significant organisational and technological changes in seaports, 
which has enabled them to improve their transportation services from a port-to-port level to a 
door-to-door level (Paixao and Marlow, 2003). Even so, the seaport sector has often been 
regarded as being ‘reactive’ to the shipping industry’s development (Paixao and Marlow, 
2003; Bichou and Gray, 2004).  
On the one hand, the development of the liner shipping sector has brought significant 
challenges to seaports. Vertical and horizontal integration strategies are widely adopted by 
LSCs. The industrial structure of the liner market has become increasingly concentrated, and 
seaports are facing intensified competition. These issues have significantly shaped the 
business environment of the maritime industry in which seaports are dealing with increasingly 
powerful liner customers (Notteboom, 2008; Woo et al., 2011).  
On the other hand, the trend of power development has shown that this transportation node is 
playing an increasingly important role in supply chains (SCs). The role of the seaport has 
evolved from being an isolated interface between land and sea transport focusing on cargo 
handling to being an integrated logistic platform in the international distribution channel 
providing various value-adding transport activities (Beresford et al., 2004). Global expansion 
and consolidation has granted TOs a stronger negotiating position with regard to LSCs 
(Heaver et al., 2001; Pallis et al., 2008; Martin and Thomas, 2001).  
Therefore, the relative market position between seaports/TOs and LSCs is unclear in view of 
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the current development of the maritime industry. This paper collects data from four Chinese 
hub seaports, namely, Xiamen Port, Shanghai Port, Qingdao Port, and Ningbo Port (see 
Figure 1), and investigates this issue by virtue of the theory of power. As an essential attribute 
of social systems, power is central to all business-to-business relationships (Cox, 2001a). In 
light of the research gap and the significance of power theory for understanding business 
relationships, this paper investigates the power relationship between TOs and LSCs in the 
context of Chinese gateway seaports.  
 
Figure 1: Four Chinese hub seaports covered in this study 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the market environment of 
the maritime industry and introduces the concept of power patterns. Section 3 describes 
methodological issues. Then, the presentation and discussion of findings are provided in 
section 4. The last section concludes the whole study.   
2. Literature Review 
The evolution of the seaport market has been significantly shaped by the development of 
seaborne trade, logistics chains, and the liner shipping industry. Thus, it is argued that the 
seaport sector is located at the end of the changing sequence of the maritime industry (Woo et 
al., 2011). In view of this sequence, this section firstly reviews key factors that have 
contributed to the restructuring of the seaport sector, based on which the research gap is 
further clarified. Then, the focus moves to the examination of the theory of power, which lays 
down the theoretical grounds for the investigation of the vested business relationship.    
2.1. The market environment  
2.1.1. Globalisation and containerisation  
Globalisation has always been closely related to the development of the maritime industry 
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(Reynaud, 2009). The rapidly globalising marketplace has shaped the geography of seaborne 
trade and poses a challenge to both seaports and LSCs. Driven by the trend of globalisation, 
production sites are widely dispersed (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), 2008). This dispersed source of production has increased the difficulty 
for seaports regarding gathering cargos and attracting ship calls, given their physical 
immobility.  
Containerisation is another influential factor that has shaped the maritime industry. Since the 
utilisation of the first container in the 1960s, the trend of containerisation has swept the liner 
shipping sector (Stopford, 2009). Containerisation has significantly improved the 
performance of logistics chains and standardised port operations and port services (OECD, 
2008). As a result, ports have become very similar in terms of their core services. Although 
the development of a port hierarchy and a hub-and-spoke system has largely defined the role 
of the port in a regional port group, ports in proximity to each other are highly substitutive.  
While port competition has been increased due to globalisation and containerisation, the 
challenge to attract port calls is further intensified by the ‘foot-loose’ feature of liner operators 
and supply chains (Heaver et al., 2001). On the one hand, LSCs are highly mobile. They act 
footloose to find a better deal in terms of port service and port charge. On the other hand, the 
mobility of liners and the global search for economic production sites have rendered SCs 
footloose as well (Robinson and Malhotra, 2005). These two factors have further intensified 
the port competition and placed seaports in a disadvantageous position when dealing with 
LSCs. 
2.1.2. The existence of strong LSCs  
The development of seaborne trade and logistics channels has also posed challenges for the 
liner shipping sector. Carriers bear the pressure of offering abundant shipping services at a 
lower cost. This pressure has significantly affected the conduct of carriers and the market 
structure of the liner industry.  
Shipping companies have used increasingly large ships in the liner trade so as to gain 
economies of scale. According to the statistics, the average size of a container ship has shown 
a continuously increasing trend since the 1980s (UNCTAD, 2008). The increase of ship size 
has a significant impact on the maritime industry, as large ships call at fewer ports. The 
reduction in the number of port calls has decreased the dependence of carriers on a particular 
port and intensified the competition among seaports, especially those that are able to 
accommodate large vessels (OECD, 2008).  
In addition, LSCs have engaged in various types of cooperation, which also improves their 
negotiating position in relation to seaports/TOs. Strategic alliance is currently the most 
popular form of cooperation adopted by carriers. It usually covers a wide scope of 
cooperation agreements including operating joint services, slot and information sharing, 
shared terminals, and pooled containers (Stopford, 2009). The formation of an alliance 
implies the control of cargos by a group of liner operators. However, it has raised concerns 
about the dominant position of LSCs over other SC members. Since carriers bring more 
business volume to the negotiating table, ports have become more dependent on LSCs 
(Heaver et al., 2000).  
In addition to the cooperation at the intra-industrial level, carriers are keen to engage in 
vertical integration and to cooperate with parties across the logistics chain. As the ‘through 
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service provider’, LSCs wish to participate in terminal operating and inland transportation in 
order to maintain the smooth operation of the logistics chain (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005). 
In the maritime industry, vertical integration is commonly adopted by carriers to seize the 
control of terminals (Van de Voorde and Vanelslander, 2009). They establish subsidiaries that 
specialise in terminal operations business and/or form joint ventures with pure terminal 
operators or with other liner operators (Kaselimi et al., 2011). Through these methods, carriers 
have strengthened their control over seaports on a global scale. 
2.1.3. The uncertainty about the relative market position between TOs and LSCs  
To deal with the restructured logistics chain and extensively consolidative activities within the 
liner shipping sector, TOs have also engaged in cooperative activities on the horizon. In 
addition, the trend of privatisation in the seaport sector has created a sound environment for 
the expansion of TOs’ business on a global scale. Consolidation and the expansion of global 
coverage can help TOs to exploit economies of scale, develop network economies, and 
optimise the terminal’s function within logistics networks (Midoro et al., 2005). From the 
perspective of inter-organisational relations, consolidation has contributed to TOs’ stronger 
negotiating position. Global expansion has increased the flexibility of service supply and 
limited the liner’s alternatives of port choice (Heaver et al., 2001). These two factors have 
also led to an increasingly concentrated seaport sector despite the involvement of integrated 
shipping lines (Pallis et al., 2008; Martin and Thomas, 2001). Therefore, the market position 
of TOs has increased over the last few decades.  
Overall, the development of logistics chains and the maritime industry has implied a seaport 
sector that is ‘reactive’ to the shipping industry and a competitive terminal operating market. 
Even so, TOs and shipping lines behave actively to improve their position in the SC and in the 
dyadic inter-organisational relation. The review of these market features has revealed a 
complex and uncertain relative market position between LSCs and TOs, which calls for 
further investigation.  
In maritime studies, terms including ‘market power’, ‘buyer power’ and/or ‘monopoly power’ 
have been widely used (e.g. Heaver et al., 2001; Song and Panayides, 2002; Van de Voorde 
and Vanelslander, 2009; Woo et al., 2011) to describe the vested business relationship. This 
popularity implies the importance of the concept of power for the ‘knowing of reality’ in the 
maritime industry. In addition, the theory of power has been an essential theory for the 
understanding of inter-organisational relations (Kaselimi et al., 2011). Accordingly, the next 
section reviews the power literature and attempts to form the theoretical basis for the 
investigation of the relative market position of TOs and LSCs.  
2.2. The pattern of power  
Power in an SC can be defined as one SC member’s ability to influence or control the 
decisions and behaviour of another member (Narasimhan et al., 2009). The issue of power is 
an essential area of study in business research. Although there is already a significant amount 
of literature on power, investigation into power remains underdeveloped in the field of 
maritime research. The concept of power has many dimensions. Whether a power relationship 
is balanced or unbalanced represents the basic understanding of power (Casciaro and 
Piskorski, 2005). This issue is referred to as power patterns in this paper.  
From the standpoint of the resource dependence theory, power imbalance refers to the 
difference in mutual dependence (Lawler and Yoon, 1996). Adopting a resource-based view, 
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Cox et al. (2002) developed a power matrix based on four possible power relationships 
between buyer (A) and supplier (B): interdependence (A=B), buyer dominance (A>B), 
supplier dominance (A<B), and independence (A0B). The illustration of the power matrix can 
be seen in Figure 2. These four types of power relationship are formed according to the 
relative amount of power held by the two parties involved in a power relationship. Whereas 
A>B and A<B refer to an imbalanced power pattern, A=B and A0B represent situations 
whereby A and B have largely equal amounts of power.        
 
 
 
Figure 2: The power matrix 
Source: Cox. (2001a) 
From a dyadic inter-organisational perspective, power imbalance is a common relationship in 
business world as seen in many studies, including Byrne and Power (2014), Kahkonen (2014), 
and Lin et al. (2013). The reason lies in the benefit of having power, which is the acquisition 
of surplus value (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Cox, 2001b; Hingley, 2005). Although a 
buyer-supplier transaction can never be solely about power, and there is always some sort of 
mutual interest between two contracting parties, not all of the interest between suppliers and 
buyers is mutual (Cox, 2001a). Given that SC members are primarily motivated by 
self-interest and strive to acquire and keep surplus value (Cox, 1999; Williamson, 1975), the 
pursuit for power is logically a primary pattern of organizational behaviour.  
The desire for a favourable power position thus offers one explanation for the conduct of TOs 
and LSCs as reviewed in the previous section. Furthermore, section 2.1 has revealed an 
unclear status regarding the relative market position between TOs and LSCs. Although this 
issue has been assessed in a number of maritime studies, it has seldom been studied 
systematically. The description of the idea of power patterns shows that this concept is closely 
related to the relative market position of SC actors. In addition, power has been an 
underdeveloped concept in SCs (Canieels and Gelderman, 2007). Therefore, the study of the 
power relationship between TOs and LSCs tends to be advantageous not only for 
understanding these two actors’ relative market positions but also for the development of 
power theory in the context of maritime logistics chain.  
3. Research Setting and Methods  
3.1. Research context  
The area of Chinese gateway seaports was selected as the research context due to the 
increasingly important role of China in international seaborne transport and the unique 
 
Buyer Dominance 
A > B 
 
Interdependence 
A = B 
 
Independence 
A 0 B 
 
Supplier Dominance 
A < B 
Low 
Low High 
 
Supplier power attributes relative to buyer 
 
Buyer power 
attributes 
relative to 
supplier 
High 
 
6 
characteristics of the market. Since the application of the open-door policy in the late 1970s, 
the economic regime of China has undergone significant changes. The remarkable economic 
growth over the last few decades has made China a major global economy. Accompanied by 
strong economic growth, international trade has boomed in China and has significantly 
changed the maritime industry. Having developed from a semi-closed state with poor 
infrastructure, China has become the most accessible nation in the world to the global liner 
shipping network (UNCTAD, 2014). In 2013, 7 out the top 10 world container ports in terms 
of throughput were Chinese ports (including Hong Kong Port) (UNCTAD, 2014).  
In addition to the essential role of China in international maritime transportation, the special 
political regime of this nation has had a significant impact on the governance structure of the 
seaport sector. The concept of governance has greatly benefited the examination of power 
issues among institutions involved in collective actions (Griffin, 2012). It is particularly 
relevant for studying power issues in countries like China, since the central and local 
government are still playing essential roles in the port sector (Wang and Slack, 2004).  
The administrative system of Chinese ports has gone through several phases. The most recent 
port reform that has helped establish the current port governance structure in China took place 
in 2003 when the Port Law of the People's Republic of China (PLC) was implemented. Port 
reform after 2003 has been characterised by two principles: the corporatisation of port 
authorities and the establishment of the municipal port administration system under the 
supervision of the provincial and central government (The National People’s Congress of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2004). Besides, PLC has encouraged the involvement of private 
funding in the port sector (PLC, 2003).  
In view of these changes, Qiu (2008) summarises three costal port governance models in 
mainland China: the general model, the Shanghai model, and the Shenzhen model. Despite 
their differences, all three models are characterised by the control of port operations by 
state-owned port corporations/groups to varying degrees. Joint ventures and/or subsidiary 
companies are established as TOs. Thus, in the context of the Chinese seaport sector, TOs 
seem to have a strong affiliation with their respective port group, which acts as the operators 
of the port. Therefore, the operator of the seaport and of the terminals within a seaport may 
behave as one party depending on the extent of the TOs’ autonomy. Accordingly, the term 
‘port/terminal operator’ (P/TO) is used in the selected research context of this paper, and the 
power pattern under study is between P/TOs in China and global LSCs.  
3.2. Research design  
A qualitative case study research design was adopted to fulfil the research aim. On the one 
hand, the selection of a qualitative approach was because of the contextual-embedded feature 
of the concept of power (Kasabov, 2007; Kim, 2000) and the research approach’s strength to 
appreciate the richness, depth, and complexity of the social reality (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
On the other hand, the purpose of this research is to explore, describe, and understand the 
vested power relationship, and the case study design was considered suitable for the 
fulfilment of these types of research purpose (Blaikie, 2010).   
Semi-structured interviews, participant observation, direct observation, and documentation 
were used to gather data. The data collection took place between May and July 2014. Seaports 
involved in the case study are Xiamen Port, Shanghai Port, Qingdao Port, and Ningbo Port 
(see Figure 1). These ports are not only essential gateways for China’s international trade, but 
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also are among the top ranked container ports in the world (see Appendix 1 for a brief 
description of these ports). The main data collection method of this study was interviews. The 
aim of interviewing in this paper was to gather data about power patterns. This means the 
interview topics were largely pre-determined. Thus, a semi-structured interview with 
open-ended questions was adopted to collect the data. An interview protocol was used in all 
cases to improve the reliability of the research. 
In terms of the application of the interview strategy, the summary can be seen in Table 1. 
Firms participating in this research consist of six TOs from four port groups in these selected 
seaports and eight global shipping lines that have established business relationships with these 
seaports. In the case of Ningbo Port and Shanghai Port, key informants from the port group 
were also approached for information. The eight carriers in this study are Maersk (involved in 
two cases), Evergreen, Hapag-Lloyd, APL, MOL, Cosco, CMA-CGM, and Zim. These 
carriers cover key global alliances in the current shipping industry, including G6, CKYHE, 
2M and O3.  
Table 1: Interview summary 
Case studies Interview summary Field work 
time (2014) Total 
No. 
Party involved No. of interviewees 
(Code) 
Xiamen Port 9 TO1 7 (XM1-7) April 
LSC1 2 (XMS1-2) 
Shanghai Port 11 TO2 6 (SH1-6) May 
TO3 
Shanghai Port Group  2 (SH7-8) 
LSC1 3 (SHS1-3) 
LSC2 
LSC3  
Qingdao Port 12 TO4 9 (QD1-9) 
 
June 
TO5 
LSC4 3 QDS (1-3) 
LSC5 
LSC6 
Ningbo Port 7 TO6 2 (NB1-2) July 
Ningbo Port Group 3 (NB3-5) 
LSC7 2 (NBS 1-2) 
LSC8 
Total 39 6 TOs and 8 LSCs (one LSC is 
involved in two case seaports) 
  
Thirty-nine interviews were conducted involving ten respondents from the shipping sector 
and the rest from the port sector. All of these respondents were from the level of director and 
above, which guarantees the quality of the data collected. All the interviews were recorded 
and subsequently transcribed. The name of the respondents was not revealed in order to 
preserve anonymity. For the convenience of referencing, each was given a code; for example, 
[XM 1] means number 1 interviewee in the case of Xiamen Port.  
The level of analysis in this paper is bilateral. Whereas P/TOs are the focus of this study, 
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respondents from both sides of the relationship, that is, P/TOs and LSCs, were interviewed to 
acquire accurate and unbiased data about the power relationship. Template analysis was 
adopted as the data analysis method. This method generates a list of codes to facilitate the 
analysis of the qualitative data set (King, 1998). The coding process started with a line-by-line 
reading of the whole transcript and the marking of possible codes. The transcripts were read 
several times in order to assure all possible codes and themes were marked. During this 
process, some higher-order categories seemed to emerge. The identification, organisation and 
further categorisation of these higher-order nodes generated the whole coding system. To 
facilitate the analysis and presentation of the power patterns in the Chinese hub seaport sector, 
Cox’s (2001a) power regimes were adopted. 
4. Findings and Discussion 
The data collected from four Chinese hub ports are analysed with reference to the theory of 
power patterns. For the inter-organisational relationship between LSCs and P/TOs, the former 
party are regarded as buyers of the port services that are supplied by the latter party. In 
general, two types of power relationships from Cox et al.’s (2002) power regimes are most 
relevant in these four cases: interdependence and supplier (P/TO) dominance. On the one 
hand, respondents recognised the close relationship between the port sector and the shipping 
sector and felt that P/TOs and LSCs are highly interdependent. On the other hand, 
interviewees indicated the powerful position as being taken by P/TOs rather than LSCs. Based 
on the interview findings, the details and evidence concerning these two dominant types of 
power patterns can be seen in Table 2. 
4.1. LSC-P/TO interdependence  
Interdependence is, unsurprisingly, a notable pattern of the power relationship between P/TOs 
and LSCs. At the inter-industrial level, the operation of the seaport sector and the shipping 
sector only make sense with the existence of the other party (Talley, 2009). As adjacent actors 
in the logistics chain, these two sectors form the transportation nodes and lines that make 
maritime trade possible. Shipping lines need a seaport to accommodate ships and load/unload 
cargos whereas the assets of a seaport are highly specific to the carriers. The interdependence 
power pattern thus stems from the ‘mutual indispensability’ of these two sectors, as one 
operational manager from TO3 mentioned. 
On the other hand, a high level of mutual dependence was also perceived at the 
inter-organisational level. The LSCs covered in this paper are top-ranking global carriers. All 
of them have established a business relationship with these four Chinese hub ports to varying 
degrees. With reference to the resource-dependence view, this means the existence of an 
interdependent relationship, which stems from the mutual demand for the other party’s 
resources. Furthermore, the mutual dependence was further strengthened by the contractual 
form of the business relationship between P/TOs and LSCs. Often renewed on an annual basis, 
the formation of a contractual relationship implies the existence of mutual interest (Cox et al., 
2002) and has been regarded by previous power researchers (e.g. Frazier, 1983; Kasabov, 
2007; Moore et al., 2004) as an indicator of mutual dependence.
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Table 2: Interview evidence for the dominant power patterns between LSCs and P/TOs in four hub ports 
Power patterns Cases Illustrative quotations 
Power 
interdependence 
Xiamen Port  ‘From the perspective of relationship, they (LSCs and P/TOs) complement each other…I feel it is more about mutual influence.’ 
[XM1] 
‘I see more and more cooperation, and their relationship is a kind of coexistence.’ [XMS1] 
Shanghai Port ‘These two sectors are dedicated to reach other, so they must tie together.’ [SH2]  
‘No party can survive without the other; it is mutual dependence.’ [SHS3] 
Qingdao Port  ‘Carriers and terminal operators have integrated. They are as close as fish and water.’ [QD2] 
Ningbo Port ‘Each party is an indispensable part of another. So they rely on each other and adjust themselves to fit the other party’s need.’ [NB2]  
‘For the relationship, they depend on each other, though it (pattern) may manifest differently in different time periods.’ [NBS2] 
P/TO dominance  Xiamen Port  ‘In China, port groups all have a strong capability to influence LSCs.’ [XM3]  
‘If the carrier does not call at the Group’s terminals, it has nowhere else to berth. So we have the advantageous position when 
negotiating.’ [XM7] 
Shanghai Port ‘Carriers can only influence the liner market. They cannot influence P/TOs, whereas P/TOs can affect them.’ [SH3] 
‘P/TOs in Shanghai Port are more powerful.’ ‘There is only one operator in this port (Shanghai Port Group). If they (carriers) want to 
berth, they have to listen to me.’ [SH7]   
‘Costal resources are scarce resources and are controlled by state-owned port groups. This tilts the scales in favour of the port side.’ 
[SHS1] 
Qingdao Port  ‘The port group is a monopoly. (….) We have no power to require the P/TO to make any changes.’ [QDA1] 
‘The terminal operator takes the significant (power) position for sure. It is a monopoly’ [QDS2] 
Ningbo Port ‘Speaking of the current stage, the port group is more powerful.’ [NBS1]  
‘No carriers can give up the market in Ningbo.’ [NB1]  
10 
In addition, the evidence for the interdependent power pattern in Table 2 reveals that the 
relationship between P/TOs and LSCs was also perceived as ‘cooperative’ and ‘integrated’. 
These types of business relationship, which can reduce uncertainty, improve efficiency, and 
increase the possibility of business success, are also advocated by the resource dependence 
theory (Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994; Crook and Combs, 2007). From the perspective of 
power patterns, it adds additional evidence for the highly interdependent relationship between 
LSCs and P/TOs. 
4.2. P/TO dominance and LSC dominance  
The power pattern of interdependence identified in these four cases does not mean that the 
power between P/TOs and LSCs is strictly balanced. The multidimensional perception about 
power patterns has been witnessed in these four cases. In addition to interdependence, P/TO 
dominance was reported in all cases. A number of reasons for this perception were offered by 
interviewees. In Table 2, noticeable factors that contribute to P/TO dominance include the 
liners’ lack of any alternative port choice, the monopoly management structure of the port 
group, and the scarcity of costal resources controlled by P/TOs.  
Exceptional findings were reported in the case of Xiamen, where the port representative of 
LSC1 felt the P/TOs in the Port of Xiamen were ‘a little weak’ despite the interdependent 
relationship between the two parties being studied. This was agreed by one director from the 
business department of TO1, who claimed LSCs were more powerful, as they are 
international corporations. Evidence from the interviews indicates that the reasons for the 
perception of LSC dominance were related to the governance structure of Xiamne Port Group 
and the level of inter-port competition.  
From the perspective of power theory, the explanations offered by the respondents for the 
power pattern regarding LSC/TO dominance were related to the source of power. 
Theoretically, this factor determines the amount of power held by social actors. As a power 
pattern is a reflection of the relative amount of power, power sources can be regarded as an 
essential indicator of the pattern of power relationships. 
4.3. The mapping of power patterns in Chinese hub seaports  
The analysis of power patterns makes possible the mapping of these four seaports’ power 
positions based on Figure 2. In Cox’s (2001a) power matrix (Figure 2), the four types of 
power relationship are formed based on the relative amount of power held by supplier and 
buyer. The location of the vested inter-organisational relationship in Figure 2 can be 
determined by the findings about the power patterns between LSCs (buyers) and P/TOs 
(suppliers) in sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
However, the original power matrix needs to be revised to fit the power patterns in the 
Chinese seaport sector. More specifically, the four power positions in Figure 2 are 
theoretically exclusive. However, evidence from the case study indicates that there is a 
multidimensional perception about vested power patterns. This means the power pattern in 
one Chinese hub seaport may be characterised by more than one type of power position in 
Figure 2. In order to address this feature, the mapping of power patterns in Chinese hub 
seaports is presented in a coordinate system (Figure 3) based on Cox’s (2001a) power matrix. 
In Figure 3, the horizontal axis represents the change of power imbalance from buyer (LSC) 
dominance to supplier (P/TO) dominance, and the vertical axis indicates the evolution of 
mutual dependence from buyer/supplier independence to buyer/supplier interdependence. 
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Scale is omitted in the coordinate system because of the qualitative nature of the data 
collected. The positioning of these four ports in Figure 3 is based mainly on interviewees’ 
perception about power patterns.  
In general, P/TOs and LSCs are highly interdependent in all these seaports. However, this 
does not mean these two parties’ power is balanced. Interview evidence has indicated that in 
addition to the interdependent relationship, the power patterns in the case of Shanghai Port, 
Ningbo Port, and Qingdao Port were also characterised by P/TO dominance. In terms of 
Xiamen Port, both buyer dominance and supplier dominance were demonstrated. The 
characteristics of the power relationship in Xiamen Port are illustrated in the figure by virtue 
of its relative location in relation to the other three ports. Based on these four ports’ location 
in Figure 3, it is noticeable that the power position of P/TOs in Xiamen Port is less 
advantageous in comparison to P/TOs in the other three hub ports.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The mapping of power patterns in Chinese hub seaports 
5. Conclusions  
By studying power patterns in the Chinese seaport sector, the relative market position 
between P/TOs and LSCs has been clarified. In general, the vested power pattern is 
multidimensional. In addition to the wide consensus about LSC-P/TO interdependence, the 
power patterns in the case of Shanghai Port, Ningbo Port, and Qingdao Port were 
characterised by P/TO dominance, whereas both P/TO dominance and LSC dominance were 
demonstrated in Xiamen Port. Therefore, a broad conclusion can be drawn regarding P/TOs’ 
powerful status in relation to LSCs in the context of Chinese hub seaports.  
This paper has applied the theory of power to the seaport and liner shipping industry. It 
attempts to raise more awareness about the study of power in the maritime sector. The paper 
adds empirical findings to the flourishing Chinese maritime market. It contributes to the 
power literature by applying Cox’s (2001a) power regimes to an underdeveloped research 
setting. The multidimensional perception about the vested power patterns implies that the four 
P/TO dominance 
Independence 
 
Shanghai Port, 
Ningbo Port and 
Qingdao Port 
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possible power positions may not be exclusive when a qualitative research design is adopted.  
Since social actors tend to pursue a favourable power position, the identification of power 
patterns has suggested directions for P/TOs and LSCs to achieve such a purpose. In addition, 
it is also important for these two parties to form a business strategy and ultimately achieve 
business success. However, respondents’ explanations about their perception of power 
patterns imply a contextual-embedded feature of this concept. Therefore, the extent to which 
the findings of this paper can be generalised to seaports in other regions of the world remains 
to be seen. The complexity of the concept of power and its underdeveloped status in SC 
studies calls for the attention of future researchers.  
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Appendix 1: The descriptions of four Chinese hub container ports (based on figures in 2012) 
Ports Throughput (million 
TEU) 
World 
ranking 
Status in national port system Major container feeder ports assigned by The Layout 
Planning of National Costal Ports 
Xiamen 
Port 
7.2 19 Hub port within the port system in southeast China  Fuzhou Port, Quanzhou Port, Putian Port and Zhangzhou 
Port 
Shanghai 
Port 
32.53 1 National gateway port, Hub port within the port system in 
Yangtze River delta 
Nanjing Port, Nantong Port, Zhenjiang Port, Lianyungang 
Port, Jiaxing Port, Wenzhou Port and Taizhou Port 
Ningbo 
Port 
15.67 6 Hub port within the port system in Yangtze River delta 
Qingdao 
Port 
14.5 8 Biggest container port in north China, Hub port of the port 
system in Shandong Province  
Yantai Port Weihai Port and Rizhao Port 
Source: Chen et al., (2013); UNCTAD, (2013); Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China, (2006). 
 
 
  
